While affirmative action for the socially and economically backward sections of society is entirely desirable, reservations are a poor design for such affirmative action. They fail two essential tests of efficacy: the design should retain the incentive to excel and, two, the design should not reinforce perceptions of backwardness. Assured quotas weaken the incentive to excel, unless those eligible for reservation are so numerous as to push the standards for selection up so high as to make reservations near-redundant. Reservations in promotions ensure that those from the reserved categories who rise to the top are perceived as having reached their position of eminence solely on account of quotas, whereas if a sufficiently large number of people from backward communities rise to the top in the absence of reservations, perceptions of their inherent backwardness would be weakened.
At a time when the goal should be to wean people off reservations, it is perverse for the government to propose yet another layer of reservations. The timing of the announcement makes it clear to the proposed beneficiaries that the motivation behind the move is political opportunism.