In recent years we’ve had fierce debates about the safety and security of Huawei, 5G, TikTok, semiconductors, ChatGPT and artificial intelligence. All of which may have given you technological indigestion. Let me add something even more threatening to the mix of the threat from China: the security of cellular (internet of things) modules.
Unlike the mythical urban rat, you really are never more than a few feet away from a cellular module. If semiconductors are the bricks with which the new industrial and lifestyle revolutions are being built, cellular modules are the doors and windows. They are small components embedded within equipment or devices which process software, have geolocation capability, e-sims to connect to the internet (in the manner of mobile phones) and much more. They transmit, receive and process vast amounts of data about their environments.
This is the stuff of nightmares. It may sound like fantasy or a sci-fi novel, but sadly it is not. We need to wake up
Cellular modules used in a vast array of industrial applications including energy, logistics, manufacturing, transport, health, security, and payment processing. At home, they are in cars, smart meters, computers, electric vehicle chargers and white goods. They monitor and control complex systems remotely. To ensure that these systems run efficiently, they collect huge amounts of data and metadata for analysis. Then through software updates, improvements are sent back to whatever they control. Like fungi, they form a mesh, independent of human action. They reach where WiFi cannot, and unlike WiFi, they don’t lose the signal at crucial moments.
If you are of a Panglossian persuasion, you will rejoice at the technological benefits cellular modules bring. And so we should. But humans being humans, there is a dark side.
In January the security services took apart a UK government car because data was being transferred via a ‘Chinese e-sim’ (they meant a cellular module) inside. The government has been tight-lipped about who used the car – or if it ever transported the Prime Minister. But we know from a separate Tesla scandal that it would be perfectly possible for a Chinese engineer to record a private conversation in a car like this with a cellular module.
Everyone has heard of Huawei and Hikvision, but few know about Quectel, Fibocom or other Chinese producers of cellular IoT modules, even though they represent a far greater threat to free and open countries.
With cellular modules, China is using the same strategy as with 5G telecommunications and Huawei/ZTE. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hopes to establish a monopoly of these vital components through these little-known companies, using subsidy, access to cheap finance, shared technology and other state support. They are making progress. Chinese companies hold 64 per cent of the global market by sales, and 75 per cent by connectivity. For North America and Europe the shares are 30 per cent, 35 per cent, and for India a whopping 86 per cent.
The aim is to drive other nations’ suppliers out of business by offering impossibly low prices, and then establish a systemic dependency upon Chinese suppliers and equipment. No doubt Quectel and others will claim, like Huawei, that they are private companies. But it does not matter: China’s security law says that they must hand over data to the organs of state security. Moreover, all bosses know that when the CCP says ‘Jump’, the only response is ‘How high?’
Using cellular modules it is possible to build up an intimate picture of someone who is being targeted. You could follow them from their front door camera, using street cameras, their car and their payments. You could even follow their conversations in cafes or clubs via lip reading technology combined with Hikvision cameras (one Chinese company, which is owned by the Central Propaganda Department, boasts the ability to translate lip reading in 65 languages).
Many people may not mind if their fridge or doorbell is spying on them for China. But you would mind if your fridge ceased to work. By sending software updates to cellular modules, China could cut off electricity supplies remotely. If the CCP succeeds in gaining a monopoly of the supply of cellular modules, it could bring down a country’s grid by targeting smart meters (which contain these modules) at a time of high electricity usage. It would take months to repair.
Or it could make traffic in London, Washington, and New York grind to a halt by disabling traffic control systems. When aircraft land or ships dock, they download their repair and maintenance schedules. Covert software instructions could ensure that they are not fit for take-off. The United States is currently developing a new satellite/cellular communication system using Quectel modules, which would allow the CCP to switch it off.
The fun and games don’t end there. At a time of tension, the CCP might decide that it is in its interests to damage the governance or economies of its western rivals. Through cellular modules, it could make our government even less efficient by messing up entry systems to buildings, interfering with alarms, or by changing air conditioning levels to make work impossible. It could also attack the NHS, or even interfere with the administering of drugs for a particular patient having an operation – a novel way of assassinating a government minister, if one fell ill.
This is the stuff of nightmares. It may sound like fantasy or a sci-fi novel, but sadly it is not. We need to wake up.
Most government ministers and officials have not heard of cellular modules. And companies need to consider the potential consequences of continuing to rely on Chinese cellular modules beyond near-term cost advantage (some western companies are proceeding with contracts despite having been made aware of the security risks: cheapness trumps long term security).
Governments should be doing more to acquaint themselves with the risks and to publicise them. Because cellular modules are already deeply embedded in our systems, wholesale ‘Rip and Replace’ is not a realistic option, except in a limited number of sensitive defence and security fields. But we need speedy action to prevent greater penetration and thereby risk. A start would be ensuring that Quectel and other Chinese companies cannot be treated as trusted suppliers in government procurement or critical infrastructure contracts.
Fortunately, there are European, American, Japanese and other companies whose products we can trust. A decent diet can help with dyspepsia.
